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1 Introduction
Suppose you hear your colleague Magdalena speak with someone in the hallway while you are 
reading a paper on your computer in your office. In the envisaged scenario, you have an audi-
tory experience of the sounds coming from Magdalena’s mouth and a visual experience of the 
graphemes on your computer screen. These two experiences are constituent parts of the total 
sensory experience you currently have. They are not integrated in any substantial sense. They 
merely co-exist as constituents of your total experience. That is, the two states are not integrated 
in a way more substantial than the way any two co-conscious states are integrated into a total 
experience at a time.
Suppose instead that you are having a conversation with Magdalena. In this case you see 
her lips move and you hear the sounds that come from them. We can literally say that you see 
Magdalena talk. The integration of your two experiences in this second scenario is different from 
the mere co-presence of your two experiences in the first. In the first scenario your experiences 
co-exist as part of your total experience. In the second scenario, your experiences are bound 
together. How do we account for the difference between the two cases?1
Casey O’Callaghan (2008, 2012, 2014, 2015; see also Dainton 2000; Nudds 2001; Bayne 
2014; Deroy 2014; de Vignemont 2014a; Briscoe 2016 in press; Bourget 2017) argues that the 
difference between the first and the second scenario is that in the first scenario the phenom-
enology of the result of binding your separate experiences can be fully accounted for by appeal 
to the phenomenology of the individual sensory modalities but that this is not so in the second 
case. In the second case, he argues, the overall phenomenology reflects that the two experi-
ences are bound together amodally in perceptual faculties that are neither auditory nor visual 
in nature—for instance, in higher non-sensory regions of the brain, such as the parietal cortex.2
In this chapter, we provide an argument for thinking that we can account for the dif-
ference in phenomenology between the two cases by appeal to the phenomenology of the 
individual sensory modalities. We argue that the phenomenology of one type of multisensory 
experience that goes beyond mere co-consciousness derives exclusively from the individual 
sensory modalities (for some empirical considerations in favor of a third type of multisensory 
experience, largely presented by speech perception, see Tuomainen et al. 2005). Call this type 
of experience “modal multisensory experience.”3 We then argue that another kind of normal 
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multisensory experience that goes beyond mere co-consciousness requires a different treat-
ment. The second type of experience is one where the phenomenology is distinctively multi-
sensory and perceptual, yet amodally integrated. Call this type of experience “amodal sensory 
experience.” This appears to be the kind of multisensory experience O’Callaghan (2012) has 
in mind. When you perceptually attribute both of the features, having a coffee look and having a 
coffee smell, to the dark liquid in your mug, the phenomenology of your experience reflects this 
type of integration. In the final section of the chapter, we look at the case of synesthesia—a 
type of atypical integration in which different sensory streams are bound together in unusual 
ways, for instance, sounds may be bound together with color. We argue that some forms of 
synesthesia may be helpful in investigating the neural mechanism underlying amodal multi-
sensory binding.
The plan is as follows: In Section 2, we provide an account that draws a distinction among 
mere co-consciousness and modal and amodal multisensory experience. On this account, modal 
multisensory experience has a phenomenology that derives from the individual senses and hence 
lacks the amodal component of multisensory experiences such as that of seeing and holding a 
tomato. In Section 3, we give reasons for thinking that some cases of integration should be con-
ceived of as instances of modal rather than amodal integration. In Section 4, we compare certain 
types of synesthesia to amodal multisensory perception and argue that these types of synesthesia 
may shed light on amodal integration.
2 Modal versus Amodal Integration
The case in which you see Magdalena speak clearly differs from a case in which you have a 
unified experience visually representing graphemes on your computer screen and auditorily 
representing Magdalena’s voice in the hallway.4 In the first case you seem to see the event 
that produces the sound, viz. Magdalena’s moving lips. Experiences of this kind are quite 
different from experiences that attribute features perceived in different sensory modalities 
to an object, as in the case of visually attributing being coffee to the dark liquid in the mug 
and olfactorily attributing coffee smell to that same liquid; or perceiving the flavor of the 
Oxtail flatbread by gustatorily, olfactorily, somato-sensorily, thermally and nociceptually 
attributing features to the flatbread. Although you attribute the smell of coffee to the coffee 
in front of you, it’s not as if you see the coffee smell in any way analogous to the way you 
hear someone speak.
The case of seeing someone speak should thus be set apart from a case of multisensory expe-
rience that is merely about or directed at the same perceptible object or feature, such as a case in 
which you both hold and see a firm ripe tomato, or see and smell coffee.5 When you hold and 
see a tomato, a shape, viz. the common sensible roundness, is both seen and felt. When you see 
and smell coffee, the attributes being coffee and having coffee smell are both perceptually attributed 
to the coffee, one by the visual modality and the other by the olfactory modality. In both cases, 
you are perceptually attributing features to one and the same object but the integration of these 
attributions into a complete experience cannot be accounted for by appeal to individual sensory 
modalities. Rather: the integration appears to be amodal: it occurs independently of the mecha-
nisms of the individual sensory modalities.6 This type of multisensory experience thus seems to 
have the characteristic that O’Callaghan (2012, 2014, 2015) thinks multisensory experience has. 
He calls this type of binding “amodal integration.” Integration is also closely related to what Tim 
Bayne and David Chalmers (2003) call “objectual unity.”
We will look at the details of the arguments for thinking that the two types come apart below 
(e.g., seeing someone speak versus seeing and smelling coffee). Suffice it to say at this point that 
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if the cases come apart in that the phenomenology of the former (e.g., seeing someone speak) 
derives fully from the individual senses whereas the phenomenology of the latter (e.g.,  holding 
a tomato you also see) does not, then O’Callaghan’s amodal view cannot be construed as a gen-
eral view of multisensory perception. As noted in the previous section, although O’Callaghan 
does not argue that amodal unification is the only sort of integration that goes beyond mere 
co-consciousness, he does not distinguish between modal and amodal unification.
The conditional claim made in the previous paragraph raises an interesting question. If the 
phenomenology in the first type of case (e.g., seeing someone speak) derives from the individual 
senses (viz., from vision and audition), how do we distinguish this type of case from the second 
type (e.g., seeing and feeling the roundness of the tomato)?
The solution to this problem, we will now argue, is to reconceive of what is actually per-
ceived by the individual senses in the first type of case when, say, we hear a source produce 
a sound. Our suggestion is that when we perceive, say, sound being produced by a source, 
the auditory experience attributes audible qualities to an object picked out by a perceptual 
demonstrative whose reference is anchored to an object, by virtue of that object being visible. 
For example, the auditory experience attributes sounding like such and such to a lip-moving 
event picked out by a perceptual demonstrative that refers to the event, by virtue of its pres-
ence in vision.
A visual demonstrative is the perceptual equivalent of demonstrative terms that occur in 
ordinary language, such as “this” and “that.” Demonstratives are referential terms that have a 
referent only when accompanied by a demonstration that successfully picks out an entity or 
a previously mentioned referent. A demonstration is, for example, a gesture, a glance or a nod 
in a particular direction or a speaker intention comprehensible by the hearer in the conver-
sational context. When a demonstrative refers back to a previously mentioned referent, as in 
“John continually scratched his skull. This annoyed Anna,” this is also known as “anaphora.” 
In the example we just provided, the anaphoric pronoun “this” refers back to the event John’s 
scratching of his skull. In anaphora, the referents of anaphoric pronouns (the anaphor) depend 
on the referents of the bit of language they are anaphoric on, i.e. the antecedent (or the post-
cedent in the case of anaphora, such as “It was her own fault that Jamie didn’t get to go to 
the prom.”). As we will see, some perceptual demonstratives function in a way analogous to 
anaphoric pronouns. Perceptual references to objects in different sensory modalities can thus 
be interdependent in the way that certain linguistic references to objects in different parts of 
speech are interdependent.
In the case of seeing someone speak, the visual experience provides a visual demonstra-
tive that picks out a speaking or lip-moving event, and the auditory experience attributes 
audible qualities to it by using the visual demonstrative. By using a visual demonstrative an 
auditory experience can become dependent on and not just co-conscious with the visual 
experience.7
It may be thought that seeing sound-events is the only example of multisensory experience 
in which perceptual unification takes place as a result of demonstrative reference being made by 
one sense and anchored by another. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Suppose you 
are lifting weights, holding one weight in your right hand. As you bend your arm, the tactile 
feel of the weight, together with the feeling of how heavy the weight is, attributes qualities to 
a demonstrative provided by the visual experience of the lifting event. That is, the feeling of 
exercising effort in lifting a weight consists in tactually and proprioceptively attributing qualities 
to a seen event, namely the lifting.
Tactile experience itself may very well be multisensory in this sense (Brogaard 2012; 
de Vignemont and Massin 2015; Briscoe 2016; see Fulkerson 2014 for challenges to the 
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 mainstream view that haptic touch is multisensory). Tactile experiences can reasonably be 
thought to involve not just representations of properties of objects but also properties of the 
body (Brogaard 2012; Briscoe 2016).8 Plausibly, you cannot have a tactile experience as of an 
object being hard without experiencing pressure to the part of your body that does the haptic 
touching. If you feel a rock press against the palm of your hand, we can take you to have an 
experience of the palm responding to the hardness of the rock, or alternatively we can take 
you to have an experience of the hardness of the rock producing a particular sensation in your 
hand. One aspect of touch thus anchors a tactile demonstrative reference to the rock. Another 
aspect of touch attributes causing certain bodily sensations in me. And that is what constitutes 
felt pressure. So, if as some research literature on touch suggests (for discussion see Loomis and 
Lederman 1986; Jones and Lederman 2006; Fulkerson 2011; Gallace and Spence 2014; Linden 
2015), the two aspects of touch involve two different sensory modalities, then this is a case of 
modal  multisensory  integration.
Further: on the assumption that emotions are multisensory experiences, it can be argued that 
they are also integrated by means of perceptual reference. Suppose you fear a particular tiger that 
bares her sharp teeth at you. Your bodily sensations (e.g., sensations of a quickened heartbeat, 
sweaty palms and shaky legs) are a response to the tiger’s fearfulness (Brogaard 2012; Brogaard and 
Chudnoff 2016). Your being afraid of a seen tiger consists of attributing the property of causing 
bodily sensations indicating a threat to your well-being to the seen tiger. Vision allows you to refer 
to the tiger, and the sensations allow you to attribute properties such as causing sensations indicat-
ing threat to your well-being. The overall fearful response just is the act of attributing the proper-
ties introduced by the bodily sensation to the object introduced by vision. This type of integration 
can be cashed out as follows: your visual experience identifies a visual event, viz. the tiger baring 
her teeth, and the bodily sensation attributes certain qualities, such as causing various events felt in 
your body, to the visually identified event.
For the case of visual-auditory binding, we can capture the distinctions among co- 
consciousness, modal integration, and amodal integration as follows:
Co-Consciousness
 Your overall experience has the content: thatv is F and thath is G [where thatv is a visual 
demonstrative, F is a visible quality, that
h
 is an auditory demonstrative reference, and 
G is an audible quality].
Modal Integration
 Your overall experience has the content: that
v
 is F and that
v
 is G [where that
v
 is a visual 
demonstrative, F is a visible quality, G is an audible quality].
Amodal Integration
 Your overall experience has the content: that
v
 is F and that
h
 is G and that
v
 = that
h
 
[where that
v
 is a visual demonstrative, F is a visible quality, that
h
 is an auditory 
demonstrative, G is an audible quality, and that
v
 = that
h
 is an amodally represented 
 identification].
One might wonder how an experience can attribute an audible quality to the referent of a 
visual demonstrative, thinking, perhaps, that an experience can only attribute audible quali-
ties to referents that are picked out in an auditory manner, say, by an auditory demonstrative 
or a description built out of audible qualities. However, as noted above in the discussion 
of anaphora, here we are simply extending a familiar form of representational dependence 
to representations in different sensory modalities. The familiar form of representational 
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 dependence in which one act of reference depends on another act of reference. As noted 
above, this is a common phenomenon in linguistic representation, for instance, in anaphora 
and in  communication across people. For example, you refer to something because your friend 
referred to it in her speech.
The phenomenon is also common in mental representation. Say you see a chess piece in a 
certain position on a chessboard. Then you close your eyes and think about or imagine moving 
it to another position on the board. Your cognitive or imaginative reference to that particular 
piece depends on your visual reference to it. It is because you saw that piece that your thought 
or imaginings are about it and not something else.
Before proceeding to our argument for the distinction between modal and amodal multisen-
sory experience, let us consider some potential challenges to this account.
One might argue that vision and audition have different manners of representation (Chalmers 
2004): vision represents visually, whereas audition represents auditorily. But multisensory expe-
rience does not represent visually or auditorily. It represents amodally (Bourget 2017). So, the 
phenomenology of modal multisensory experience is not wholly derived from the phenom-
enology of the individual sensory modalities. Or so the argument goes.
This argument can be resisted, however. Rather than saying that manners of representation 
change from visual to amodal when the sound is added, it is perfectly plausible to take manners 
of representation to be additive. When you hear someone speak, your experience represents in 
a visuo-auditory manner.
A further challenge to the proposed account is that of explaining where in the brain bind-
ing takes place if indeed its phenomenology is fully derived from the phenomenology associ-
ated with the individual sensory modalities. This challenge can be met. We know from the 
McGurk effect that seeing lip movements can influence and alter what we hear. The McGurk 
effect arises when auditory speech cues are presented in synchrony with incongruent visual 
speech cues (McGurk and MacDonald 1976). For example, when the auditory syllable “ba” 
is presented in synchrony with a speaker mouthing “ga,” subjects typically report hearing 
“da.” We also know from the double-flash illusion that auditory input sometimes influences 
what we see. The double-flash illusion occurs when the presentation of two brief auditory 
beeps makes a single flash look like two flashes (Shams et al. 2000). So, just considering visuo-
auditory cases for now, the answer to the question of where in the brain this type of binding 
takes place is likely that it sometimes occurs in the auditory cortex and sometimes in the 
visual cortex. Whether the integration occurs in visual or auditory areas is likely to depend 
on what is taken to produce what. When seen lip movements are taken to produce sound in 
the McGurk illusion, it is likely that the binding takes place in the auditory cortex. When the 
beeps are taken to produce the flashes in the double-flash illusion, the binding likely takes 
place in the visual cortex.
A third worry one might have about our proposed account is that it implies that multisen-
sory integration is perceptual. But, it may be argued that multisensory integration is associative 
or inferential rather than perceptual. This has indeed been the traditional view of multisensory 
perception (see e.g. Bloom and Lazeron 1988). However, there are numerous empirical consid-
erations in favor of the view that multisensory experience typically is genuinely perceptual and 
not e.g. associative (for an overview of empirical considerations, see e.g. Giard and Péronnet 
1999; Molholm et al. 2002; Klemen and Chambers 2011; Talsma 2015). 
Here are two philosophical considerations in favor of the view that multisensory experience 
is perceptual rather than, say, associative. Ordinary visual experiences that result from stimula-
tion of the individual senses, such as your visual experience of the line drawing of a rectangle in 
Figure 24.1, possess two interesting characteristics.
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One is that your experience does not just represent something as being the case, but is also 
felt as putting you in touch with its subject matter (see Chudnoff 2014, 2016 for a discussion of 
this characteristic). One way to understand the idea of subject matter is in terms of truthmakers, 
where the truthmaker of an experience can be understood as the external mind-independent 
object in virtue of whose existence or non-existence the content of the experience is true or 
false (cf. Armstrong 1989: 88). So, here the truthmaker of your experience is the drawing of the 
rectangle. It is as if your experience makes you directly aware of the drawing of the rectangle. 
We’ll call this characteristic “presentational phenomenology.”
In order for an experience to have presentational phenomenology, it is not necessary that we 
appear to see all aspects of what is presented to us. Consider the following case. You walk down 
the hallway and see a dog, partially occluded from your field of vision (Figure 24.2).
In spite of the fact that only the non-occluded parts of the dog reflect light that reaches your 
retina, it appears to you as if there is a whole dog, not merely a part of a dog.9 So, your experi-
ence of the dog has presentational phenomenology.
Another characteristic of ordinary visual experience is that it is evidence insensitive (under-
stood as a feature of the phenomenology; see Brogaard 2016, in press a, for a discussion of this 
characteristic). Consider the Müller-Lyer illusion in Figure 24.3 (the figure on the left).
Figure 24.1  Line Drawing of a Rectangle. Every part of your experience of the line drawing has 
presentational phenomenology
Figure 24.2  Occluded Dog. Even though the occluded parts of the dog do not make an imprint on the 
retina, the visual system nonetheless generates a complete dog. This is also known as “amodal 
completion”
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The two line segments on the left strongly appear to have different lengths. However, as the 
marking on the right illustrates, they have exactly the same length. Our knowledge of this fact 
(our possession of evidence), however, does not change the visual appearance of the line seg-
ments on the left. They continue to look as if they have different lengths. This evidence insensi-
tivity is typical of the archetypes of visual experience.
Just like experiences that result from amodal completion can have presentational phenom-
enology, they can also be evidence insensitive. Consider again the image of the occluded dog in 
Figure 24.2. Although an occluder obscures your line of sight, you naturally see this as a com-
plete dog. Now, let’s remove the occluder (Figure 24.4). The experience produced by the process 
of amodal completion in Figure 24.2 turned out to be illusory. The dog is lacking its middle part. 
However, even after it’s revealed that there isn’t a complete dog behind the occluder, what is pre-
sented in Figure 24.2 still appears equally complete. So, the amodally completed experience per-
sists (i.e., the dog looks complete) even when we know that the world is not as it appears to be.
Now, let’s consider whether modal and amodal multisensory experience possess the two 
characteristics: presentational phenomenology and evidence insensitivity. We shall here focus on 
the modal integration cases, but nothing in what follows hinges on this. Consider once again 
a case of seeing a source produce a sound. Suppose we see a busboy lose his grip on a stack 
of plates he is carrying. They hit the tile floor in the restaurant right in front of our table. This 
results in the loud sound of plates breaking against the tile floor. We can literally hear the plates 
break. In the envisaged scenario, it would appear that we are in direct conscious touch with 
the event producing the sound. The multisensory experience of hearing the plates break has 
an integrated presentational phenomenology that consists partly in the phenomenology of the 
visual experience that produces the analog of a demonstrative and partly in the phenomenology 
of the auditory experience that attributes audible qualities to the seen event. The fact that the 
Figure 24.3  The Müller-Lyer Illusion. Even when you learn that the line segments on the left have the 
same length, they continue to appear as if they have different lengths
Figure 24.4  Incomplete Drawing of a Dog. Even after seeing that there is nothing behind the occluder 
in this figure, the visual nonetheless still generates a visual experience of a dog when viewing 
the occluded figure in Figure 24.2
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multisensory experience has an integrated presentational phenomenology gives us some reason 
to think that the phenomenology is perceptual.
Now consider the phenomenon of ventriloquism. We know that the ventriloquist produces 
the voice of the puppet in his hand. Even so, the voice perceptually appears to come from the 
puppet’s mouth. The appearance that the puppet is speaking is so strong that it persists in spite 
of our knowledge that this is not so—which is to say, ventriloquism is evidence insensitive. In 
fact, most of us are taking advantage of the evidence-sensitivity of ventriloquism on a daily basis, 
when we watch television.
Multisensory experience thus can have a presentational phenomenology and may be evidence 
insensitive. This indicates that the integration process is perceptual as opposed to inferential or 
loosely associative.
3 Modal versus Amodal Binding: An Argument
Above, we distinguished a notion of modal integration and made a prima facie case for describ-
ing some cases of mutisensory integration in terms of it. The aim of this section is to argue that 
there are cases of integration that cannot be accounted for in terms of amodal integration but 
can be explained only given the notion of modal integration.
Modal integration requires that qualities represented because they are perceived in one 
modality are attributed to an object or event represented because it is perceived in another 
modality. Amodal integration does not require this sort of dependence; modality 1 attributes 
qualities to an object because it is perceived in modality 1, and modality 2 attributes qualities to 
an object because it is perceived in modality 2; the integration, that is the identification of the 
object presented in modality 1 with the object presented in modality 2, is performed amodally.
To see that the two notions of integration come apart, let us consider some phenomena 
of referential dependence that amodal integration by itself is unable to account for.10 Imagine 
being at a cocktail party whose acoustics disrupt one’s ability to hear sounds as coming from 
specific directions and where everyone has the same voice and everyone is speaking the same 
words. Despite the unusual conditions you might have a sensory experience as of some specific 
person speaking. In order for this to be the case, you will need to have some sensory manner of 
picking out the person, let’s stipulate a visual manner. The experience of seeing someone speak 
cannot be the result of visually referring to a person, aurally referring to a person, and amodally 
identifying the referents. Since you are in an environment where you cannot pick out individu-
als by their sounds alone there is no aural reference to any particular person. You can, however, 
pick out people by their looks, positions, and motions. So, you are able to identify who is saying 
what by visually referring to a person and aurally exploiting that reference in order to attribute 
the quality of saying something to him or her. This results in what we call a modally integrated 
experience as of some specific person speaking.
It should be emphasized that the dependence relation in modal multisensory experience 
can go in both directions. Suppose you are out jogging one particularly foggy morning. You 
see a person wave to you from the other side of the street. As it turns out, it is your colleague 
Magdalena. But the visibility is not good enough for you to identify the speaking event as an 
event in which your colleague is speaking on the basis of the person’s look, posture or gait. You 
can, however, identify the event as a speaking event by your colleague by the sound of her voice 
as she shouts “Hey! See you later at work!” In this case the low visibility prevents you from 
identifying the speaking event as being the event of your colleague speaking. You can, however, 
identify this event on the basis of your auditory perception of the sound event. Here visual 
qualities are attributed to a sound event identified by audition.
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To summarize: In our first case vision enables you to pick out a person and their speaking 
motions. But your overall experience involves attributing audible qualities to that person and 
their speaking motions. Audition alone, however, is not sufficient for this attribution. Audition 
is dependent on vision in that it attributes the quality of making certain sounds to the seen 
person and their speaking motions. It does this by making use of a reference to that person and 
their speaking motions which is supplied by vision. In the third case the dependence goes in the 
other direction since vision depends on audition for its possession of the further content that 
the person speaking is one we recognize (e.g., Magdalena).
Amodal integration differs from modal integration in that there is no referential dependence. 
If you are seeing and holding a tomato, the object you are seeing and holding can be picked 
out in virtue of how it appears within each sensory modality. You see the tomato as shiny, and 
your touch identifies the tomato as firm. You do not need vision to confirm that the tomato 
you see is firm, and you do not need your sense of touch to confirm that the tomato is shiny. 
What integration accomplishes in this case is the attribution of the two qualities shiny and firm 
to one and the same object.
Of course, multisensory perception also attributes common sensibles to objects, for instance, 
roundness to the tomato. But you can confirm that the tomato is round by sight or touch alone. 
You don’t need both sensory modalities to perceptually establish this. If you are unable to per-
ceive the roundness in one sensory modality, this simply means that roundness is not a common 
sensible for you. Integration is needed for you to come to have a mutlisensory experience of 
tomato as round. This suggests that the unitary experiences in the case of amodal multisensory 
integration are prior temporally to the multisensory experience itself, which is consistent with 
the integration taking place in higher brain regions, such as the parietal cortex. So, amodal 
multisensory experience does not require that qualities perceived in one sensory modality are 
attributed to an event perceived in another sensory modality in order for the integration to 
occur. Hence, modal and amodal multisensory experience are distinct.
4 Synesthesia
In the previous sections, we have been concerned primarily with ordinary multisensory experi-
ence. We should, however, briefly compare ordinary multisensory experience to one of the most 
common forms of atypical multisensory experience, viz. synesthesia (occurring in 4–7 percent of 
the population). Synesthesia is a peculiar way of experiencing the world in which internal or exter-
nal input gives rise to atypical sensations or thoughts (Baron-Cohen et al. 1987; Cytowic 1989; 
Grossenbacher and Lovelace 2001; Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001b; Rich and Mattingley 
2002; Ward 2013). For example, seeing the number 3 printed in black ink may lead to a sensation 
of copper green, hearing the word “abyss” may flood the mouth with the flavor of minestrone 
soup and hearing the key of C# minor may elicit a slowly contracting turquoise spiral.
In grapheme-color synesthesia, one of the most common forms of synesthesia, perceiving 
or thinking about an achromatic grapheme (also known as the “inducer”) triggers the sensa-
tion or thought (also known as the “concurrent”) that the grapheme has a specific color with 
a highly specific hue, brightness and saturation (Simner et al. 2006). The concurrent images are 
either projected onto the external world (projector synesthesia) or perceived in the mind’s eye 
(associator synesthesia) (Dixon et al. 2004). In projector synesthesia, the projected concurrent 
may be seen as instantiated like non-synesthetic colors, as floating above its inducer or as an 
“afterimage” that floats close to the subject’s eyes. In associator synesthesia, the concurrent image 
is seen internally, much like a visual image retrieved from memory or produced by imagination.
Two key characteristics of synesthesia are (i) automaticity and (ii) stability and consist-
ency over time. Automaticity refers to the observation that synesthetes cannot suppress the 
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 association between an inducer and its concurrent. Stability and consistency over time refer to 
the observation that inducer-concurrent associations are highly stable and consistent in more 
than 80 percent of cases (Mattingley et al. 2001). Automaticity is supported by research showing 
that synesthetes are susceptible to Stroop effects (Stroop 1935). The most common Stroop task 
demonstrates that it takes significantly longer for neurotypical individuals to name the color 
in which a color word is printed if the color referred to by the word is incongruent with the 
printed color (see Figure 24.5). Likewise, it takes significantly longer for synesthetes to name the 
printed color of a grapheme if the synesthetic color induced by the grapheme is incongruent 
with the printed color (Mattingley et al. 2001).
Consistency and stability over time in grapheme-color and sound-color synesthesia is com-
monly tested using the synesthesia battery on separate occasions (Eagleman et al. 2007). In the 
test of grapheme-color synesthesia, a subject is presented with a randomly chosen grapheme, 
for which she must choose a specific hue, brightness and saturation from a color palette repre-
senting over 17.6 million distinct choices. After the subject has repeated the task three times for 
each grapheme (108 trials; graphemes A–Z and 0–9), the geometric distance among the subject’s 
answers in red, green and blue color space is calculated. Synesthesia requires that the geometric 
distance falls below a normalized threshold.
Projector synesthesia (where the concurrent is projected out onto the external visual scene) 
is not always a genuine form of multisensory or multisensory-stream experience. Evidence 
indicates that some grapheme-color synesthetes have an unusual structural connection between 
the color area in the brain and the neighboring form area (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001a; 
Rouw and Scholte 2007; Jancke et al. 2009; Hanggi et al. 2011). Likewise, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that some sound-color synesthetes have an unusual structural relation between 
auditory areas and the form area (Zamm et al. 2013). Because a structural relation directly 
combines two areas of the brain that are not normally directly combined, the synesthetic experi-
ences in structurally induced synesthesia are not best characterized as multimodal but are better 
characterized as an augmented form of ordinary unimodal perception. The individual sensory 
pathways are simply mistakenly, or atypically, blended into a single pathway, thus forming an 
augmented sensory pathway that yields illusory or hallucinatory experiences (e.g., the experi-
ence of the musical note D as purple or the experience of a black letter as red).
The more interesting cases of synesthesia for our purposes are cases of associator synes-
thesia (and perhaps functional cases of projector synesthesia) that are a result of unusual bind-
ing in higher areas of the brain, most likely the parietal cortex. On the so-called disinhibited 
integration model, synesthesia occurs owing to disinhibition of an area in the parietal cortex 
that is thought to bind information from different senses, causing information from one sen-
sory modality to trigger the projection of information from another modality (Grossenbacher 
1997; Armel and Ramachandran 1999; Grossenbacher and Lovelace 2001; Myles et al. 2003). 
Information from the two sensory sources is then integrated. For example, information about 
the identity of a grapheme may combine with abnormal color information, giving rise to an 
experience of an abnormally colored grapheme.
One important piece of evidence cited in favor of this hypothesis comes from a case study 
in which a patient PH reported seeing visual movement in response to tactile stimuli following 
Figure 24.5  The Stroop Effect. The word “red” is displayed in the color black (left) and the color green 
(right—here displayed in gray). It takes longer for subjects to name the ink color of the word 
“red” when it is printed in green than when it is printed in black or red
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acquired blindness (Armel and Ramachandran 1999). As PH was blind, he could not have received 
the information via standard visual pathways. It is plausible that the misperception was a result of 
disinhibited integration of tactile information and information from the visual motion areas.
Another piece of evidence cited in favor of the disinhibited integration model is the observation 
that visual context and meaning can influence the phenomenal character of synesthetic experience 
(Myles et al. 2003; Dixon and Smilek 2005). To illustrate, consider the two words in Figure 24.6. 
Some grapheme-color synesthetes assign different colors to the shared letter depending on 
whether they interpret the string of letters as spelling the word “POT” or the word “JACK.” For 
example, a grapheme-color synesthete might have an experience of the shared letter as yellow (O) 
when she reads the word “pot” but have an experience of the letter as pink (C) when she reads 
the word “Jack.” One way to explain this phenomenon is that amodal completion of the shared 
grapheme takes place when the synesthete is reading the word “POT” but not when she is reading 
the word “JACK.” This explanation is consistent with there being a direct structural connection 
between the form and the color area in the brain. However, the more widely accepted explanation 
is that it’s not the shape actually presented in experience that triggers the color experience, but 
rather the higher-level property of being a particular grapheme (e.g., being the grapheme O or being 
the grapheme C ) (Cytowic and Eagleman 2009: 75).
Synesthesia of this second type and ordinary multisensory experience that results from 
amodal integration both appear to involve higher-level perceptual brain regions (like the pari-
etal cortex) in the integration process, and both types of integration involve attributing features 
to one and the same object (e.g., being the musical note D and being purple). Using the example of 
seeing and holding a firm tomato and hearing the musical note D as purple, we can illustrate 
the commonalities between the two phenomena as follows:
Normal Amodal Integration
Your overall experience has the content: thatv is a tomato and thatt is firm and thatv = 
that
t
 [where that
v
 is a visual demonstrative, and that
t
 is a tactile demonstrative, and  
that
v
 = that
t
 is an amodally represented identification].
Figure 24.6  Jackpot Figure. Synesthetes interpret the middle letter as a C when it occurs in “Jack” and 
as an O when it occurs in “pot.” The color of their synesthetic experience will depend on 
which word the grapheme is considered a part of
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Amodal Integration in Sound-Color Synesthesia
Your overall experience has the content: that
h
 is the musical note D and that
v
 is purple 
and that
h
 = that
v
 [where that
h
 is an auditory demonstrative, and that
v
 is a visual demon-
strative, and that
h
 = that
v
 is an amodally represented identification].
Now, as noted above, synesthesia also occurs within a single sensory modality combining differ-
ent sensory streams. In grapheme-color synesthesia, for example, a shape property (e.g., having 
the shape of the grapheme 3) and a color (e.g., being green) are visually attributed to a grapheme 
printed in black. Although this phenomenon is not genuinely multisensory, it nonetheless fits the 
model. Two visual properties that normally are not integrated are amodally attributed to one and 
the same object, after being computed separately in separate sensory streams. Using the example 
of seeing the grapheme 3 as green, we can illustrate this as follows:
Amodal Integration in Grapheme-Color Synesthesia
Your overall experience has the content: that
v1
 has the shape of the grapheme 3 and 
that
v2
 is purple and that
v1
 = that
v2
 [where that
v1
 is a form area demonstrative, and 
that
v2
 is a color area demonstrative, and that
v1
 = that
v2
 is an amodally represented 
identification].
Because of the similarities between synesthesia of the kind under consideration and amodal 
multisensory experience, research into synesthesia of this type will likely be able to shed light on 
the process underlying integration in ordinary amodal multisensory experience.
5 Conclusion
We can divide multisensory experiences that go beyond mere co-consciousness (co-conscious-
ness as in the experience of tasting the wine and hearing the siren from the street) into two 
broad categories. Multisensory experiences—such as feeling the roundness of a tomato through 
touch and seeing the roundness of the tomato, smelling the Indian curry and seeing it boil or 
perceiving the flavor of the Oxtail flatbread by gustatorily, olfactorily, somato-sensorily, thermaly 
and nociceptually attributing features to the flatbread—attribute one or more features to a single 
object. Experiences of this kind arguably have a phenomenology that reflect that they are inte-
grated amodally. As we have seen, however, not all forms of multisensory perception are amodal 
in this sense. Some forms are distinctly perceptual and have a phenomenology that derives from 
the phenomenology of the individual sensory modalities. Seeing someone speak and feeling the 
rock press against the palm are experiences of this latter kind. Synesthesia is a form of atypical 
multisensory experience that in some instances involves integration of the first type. Research 
into this type of synesthesia might thus help shed light on the mechanism underlying amodal 
integration.11
Notes
1 It is widely agreed that there are temporal and spatial congruity constraints on multisensory integration 
(see e.g. O’Callaghan 2014). If, for example, the visual and audible properties are temporally incongru-
ous you will fail to see a seen event as the one producing the sound. If, for instance, you see a drummer 
but then hear the drumming sounds only ten seconds later, you will fail to attribute the sound to the 
drumming. Likewise, if the visual and audible properties are blatantly spatially incongruous, you will 
fail to see a seen event as the one producing the sound. Suppose, for instance, that you see a person to 
the left of you move her lips and you also hear corresponding sounds in the distance—far too removed 
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from the person to be attributable to her. In that case, you will not perceive the person as producing 
the sounds. We are going to take that for granted in what follows.
 2 The idea of the phenomenology deriving exclusively from the phenomenology of the individual sen-
sory modalities is formulated as follows by O’Callaghan (2015: 555): “The phenomenal character of 
each perceptual episode is exhausted by that which is associated with each individual modality, along 
with whatever accrues thanks to mere co-consciousness.”
 3 While amodal experience may seem to be a kind of perception that is cognitively penetrated, most 
cognitive effects on the integration turn out primarily to be related to attention. Multisensory integra-
tion is thus largely accounted for by attentional mechanisms (see Talsma 2015).
 4 For simplicity’s sake, we shall here assume a representational account of experience according to which 
the phenomenology of experience (at least typically) reflects a representational content. This is also an 
assumption made by e.g. O’Callaghan (2012). See also Bourget (2017). Here we are not taking a stance 
on the question of whether strong representationalism about multisensory experience is feasible (for 
discussion see e.g. O’Dea 2006; Tye 2007; and Bourget 2017).
 5 Bourget (2017) also distinguishes between these two types of multisensory experience (that go beyond 
mere co-consciousness). However, he argues for a view where the two have different generalized con-
tents. Seeing something produce a sound has a content of the form ∃x,y(F(x) ∧ G(y) ∧ R(x,y), where x 
and y range over related entities to which different features are attributed. Seeing and feeling a tomato, 
by contrast, has a content of the form: ∃x(F(x) ∧ G(x)). Here different features are attributed to one and 
the same object.
 6 The intermodal interaction can be direct or facilitated by cortico-thalamo-cortical pathways (see 
Talsma 2015).
 7 We can still allow for the possibility that lip reading can produce an experience of meanings (cf. 
Brogaard 2016). In this case, however, the experience of meanings is not auditory but visual, much like 
the case of ordinary reading.
 8 Bodily sensations (or bodily feelings—a sub-set of the set of interceptive experiences) have not tra-
ditionally been construed as sensory experiences. However, one might argue that the modality that 
produces bodily feelings just is a sensory modality closely related to proprioception, our sense of bal-
ance (the vestibular system) and nociception (pain and spice perception), which arguably are sensory 
modalities, unlike intuition and introspection (Macpherson 2011; Schwenkler 2013; Briscoe 2016). 
Not much hinges on how we settle this issue.
 9 We shall set aside the issue of whether we can perceive high-level properties like that of being a dog. 
Let it be granted for argument’s sake that we can perceive such properties. Nothing in what follows 
hinges on this assumption.
10 For other illustrative examples of cases where the information in one sensory modality cannot be 
decoded without the assistance of a second sensory modality, see e.g. Talsma (2015). One illuminating 
example is that of the Swedish chef in The Muppet Show. Upon your first encounter with the character, 
his speech sounds entirely garbled. After multiple other cues (primarily visual) have been presented to 
you, you realize that the character actually utters English sentences but with an extremely anomalous 
accent (analogous to sine-wave speech).
11 For comments on this chapter we are grateful to Anna Drozdzowicz, Rocco J. Gennaro, Anders Nes, 
Sebastian Watzl, the participants in a multisensory perception seminar in Oslo and an audience at a 
cognitive penetration workshop in Bergen.
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